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BLNAK

3 min read #security #privacy

What data a launcher *could* collect — and why BLNAK collects none of it

Launchers have privileged access to your entire app list, usage patterns, and contacts. Here is the full scope of what they could exfiltrate — and the list of what BLNAK actually does.

A launcher is one of the most privileged apps on your phone. It has to know what apps you have installed, which you use most often, and — if you grant permission — your contacts. This privileged position is exactly why launcher privacy deserves more scrutiny than, say, calculator apps.

Here is the comprehensive list of what a malicious or careless launcher could collect about you. Every item on this list has been observed in at least one commercial launcher in the wild.

The full exfiltration menu

  • The complete list of apps installed on your device, including app package names, version numbers, and install timestamps. This alone is an identifying fingerprint — your app list is as unique to you as a handwriting sample.
  • App launch counts and timestamps, which reveal your daily routines, work schedule, and private habits (dating apps, medical apps, finance apps).
  • Your contacts, if the app requests and you grant permission.
  • Your home-screen layout, which signals preferences advertisers pay for.
  • Device identifiers — advertising ID, device model, OS version, carrier, language, timezone.
  • IP address, captured on every network request, which provides approximate location.
  • The widgets you use, including which news sources, which calendars, which weather providers.
  • Search queries you type in the launcher’s search bar — essentially a log of your intent.
  • Screenshot-like data through accessibility services, if abused.

In 2021, a major Android launcher was caught transmitting the full app list of every user to an ad-tech server twice a day. In 2023, another was found logging search queries. These were launchers with hundreds of millions of installs. The practice is common enough that Google Play’s policy now bans it — but detection relies on researchers noticing.

What BLNAK actually collects

None. Not a reduced subset. Not an anonymized sample. Not “aggregated analytics”. Zero.

  • App list: read from Android only, never transmitted.
  • Launch counts: stored in private SharedPreferences, cleared on uninstall.
  • Contacts: optional, read-only, never transmitted.
  • Search queries: processed in memory, never logged, never transmitted.
  • Device identifiers: not accessed.
  • IP address: not accessible because BLNAK has no network permission.

Why we can claim this credibly

Because you can verify it (see the post on verification in this blog). Because the source is public. Because the manifest blocks network access at the OS level. And because, as a free open-source project, we have no commercial incentive to collect anything — we don’t sell ads, we don’t sell data, we don’t have shareholders to please.

The safest data is data that was never collected. BLNAK was designed around exactly that principle.